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How Socio-Legal Norms Emerge within Complex 
Networks: Law and (In)Formality at Ipanema Beach 
Pedro R. Fortes* 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the interplay of formal and informal normative 
arrangements and provides an ethnographical analysis of socio-legal norms 
at Ipanema Beach in Brazil.  For Brazilian society, beaches are so important 
that even constitutional norms regulate their operation and guarantee free 
access for everyone.  Likewise, Brazilians usually refer to beaches as 
‘democratic spaces’ and this paper discusses the exotic association between 
a geographical area and governmental structure.  Is equal participation and 
symmetrical power for all beachgoers in Brazil realistic, or is this notion of 
a democratic beach just a myth? 
This article also focuses on the existence of an informal food market at 
Ipanema Beach and analyzes its regulation, informal arrangements of 
antitrust (anticompetitive market prices), as well as issues of environmental 
and consumer protection.  In addition, this study assesses informal land 
regimes and discusses which norms are available to regulate the occupation 
of the space by beachgoers.  In this context, tent managers and informal 
parking-space-finders provide informal arrangements that guarantee 
parking, tents, and chairs for beachgoers.  The State is also present at 
Ipanema Beach by way of municipal guards, police officers, and lifeguards, 
who are expected to enforce the laws and maintain order. 
However, there are many examples of resistance to legal regulations 
and to criminal law enforcement.  For instance, marijuana smokers tend to 
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frequent a particular area of the Beach and they make noise to alert others 
of police officers in an effort to prevent arrests.  Further, frescobol (a local 
game played with rackets) players are not fined for playing the game at 
certain times, but at non-designated times their sanctions consist of 
warnings, threats to report them to authorities, and eventually the 
confiscation of the ball.  Dogs are also prohibited, but are tolerated in an 
isolated corner of the Beach.  In summary, a range of (in)formal normative 
arrangements characterize law and society at Ipanema Beach. 
I.  A METHODOLOGICAL EXCURSUS: THE CONFESSIONAL APPROACH, 
RETROSPECTIVE PARTICIPATORY OBSERVATION, AND ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVES IN SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 
Before starting my analyses, I would like to state that three 
methodological aspects of my research should not be ignored and highlight 
them for discussion with all participants of this symposium.  First, this is a 
confessional paper in the sense that it contains autobiographical 
information.  Immediately after birth, I was taken to my parents’ apartment 
fifty meters away from Ipanema Beach and have lived most of my life 
there.  In contrast to my parents, who were teenagers when they moved to 
Rio de Janeiro, Ipanema was always a part of my life and going to the beach 
there was a regular form of leisure.  Therefore, I am not only analyzing 
socio-legal norms in a limited spatial area, but also revisiting a very 
important part of my own existence when I discuss law and (in)formality at 
Ipanema Beach.  Unlike Ellickson in Shasta County,1 Goffman in Bali,2 and 
Sousa Santos in Pasargada,3 I am dealing with a very particular universe 
that I experienced predominantly as a participant rather than an observer.  
Resultantly, I borrow from Joaquim Falcão this sense that an 
autobiographical project—like my work here—is confessional.4 
Second, I would consider my work to be an ethnographic study, as I 
am providing a thick description of legal culture within Ipanema Beach.5  
However, this study has one very important distinction from traditional 
social anthropology.  According to traditional anthropological research, 
researchers define their main investigation, questions, and research agenda 
prior to their field trip and to their immersion within the investigated 
 
1  See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors 
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). 
2  See generally Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1977). 
3  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction 
of Legality in Pasargada, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5 (1977). 
4  JOAQUIM FALCÃO, ET AL., TEORIA DO DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL (6th ed., FGV Direito Rio 
Editora, 2008). 
5  Geertz, supra note 2. 
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community.  In my case, the research question was offered to me by 
accident a couple of years ago.  As a Stanford Program in International 
Legal Studies (“SPILS”) student in 2007, I was chatting with my professor, 
Lawrence Friedman, during the break in one of our Law and Society 
classes.  Professor Friedman was contemplating a visit to Brazil and 
mentioned that one of his friends once went to a beach in Rio. 
After enjoying a nice swim, he found out that all his belongings had 
been stolen.  After hearing this story, I explained to Professor Friedman that 
locals know about these dangers, and always ask someone to look after our 
belongings when they go swimming.  Professor Friedman commented that 
this informal social arrangement could be a point of departure for a study of 
law and society on Brazilian beaches.  His insight into how many 
interesting and informal social norms could probably be found in such a 
context made me retrospectively consider my three decades of experience 
as a beachgoer. It also encouraged me to assess this interplay of formal 
legal rules and informal social norms at Ipanema Beach.  Unlike Nader in 
Mexico,6 Levi-Strauss in Brazil,7 and Pirie in Tibet,8 I was not capable of 
pursuing prospective research, but rather retrospective observation as a 
participant beachgoer in the investigated universe. 
Therefore, one of the interesting questions for discussion is whether 
retrospective participatory observation is a valid methodological tool for 
socio-legal research.  In my opinion, it could be considered a valid tool, as 
long as it is used it for exploratory socio-legal research, and its limitations 
regarding the generalization of research findings are acknowledged.  
Admitting to the validity of retrospective participatory observation may 
enrich the methodological toolbox of socio-legal research. It would also 
create opportunities for researchers to provide more detailed, textured, and 
nuanced analyses of universes they have experienced as active participants 
prior to conducting their research.  In any event, socio-legal research is 
always dependent on inter-subjective approval of a community of socio-
legal scholars, and findings are always evaluated and judged by rigorous 
peer-review, which negotiates some of the issues associated with subjective 
research.  Likewise, retrospective participatory observation should only be 
limited to research projects in which the memory of the researcher and the 
reconstruction of past experiences are more adequate for the analysis than 
 
6  See generally LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC 
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (Stanford Univ. Press 1990). 
7  See generally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES (John Weightman & Doreen 
Weightman trans., Penguin rev. ed. 1992). 
8  See generally  FERNANDA PIRIE, PEACE AND CONFLICT IN LADAKH: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
FRAGILE WEB OF ORDER (Brill Academic Publishers 2007). 
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other methodological tools and strategies.9 
Third, and in addition to the confessional approach and retrospective 
participatory observation, this paper also benefits from using the analytical 
narrative technique, which combines the descriptive element of historical 
narratives with the analytical element of rational choice theory and game 
theory.10  Consequently, the paper is not limited to a thick description of 
law and society at Ipanema Beach, but also analyzes a set of incentives and 
disincentives that relevant legal actors have for their conduct within this 
socio-legal universe.  As a research technique, analytical narratives have 
been widely used in international relations and history, and could also be 
explored for socio-legal studies.  As this combination of a confessional 
approach, retrospective participatory observation, and analytical narratives 
seems unusual, I have provided the reader with this methodological 
excursus for our discussion. 
II.  IPANEMA BEACH AS A SOCIO-LEGAL SPACE: SOCIAL TRIBES, NETWORK 
MEMBERSHIP, AND CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS 
Ipanema Beach is just one of forty-six beaches found in Rio de 
Janeiro, but is known worldwide because of the famous bossa nova song 
“The Girl from Ipanema.”  Ipanema comprises a strip of white sands, 2.6 
kilometers long, between a 130-meter canal named the “Garden of Allah” 
(separating Ipanema from Leblon), and a rocky formation known as “the 
harpooner’s rock” (separating Ipanema from Copacabana).  In the 
indigenous language of Tupy, Ypanema means “useless water” and this may 
be a reference to the existence of a large lagoon one kilometer from 
Ipanema Beach that historically had no fish due to its pestilent waters.  In 
1894, the neighborhood of Ipanema was founded on this small patch of land 
between the lagoon and the Beach.  Ipanema was far away from downtown 
Rio and was instead an isolated part of Rio de Janeiro with just a few 
houses.  Since the 1970s, Ipanema has become one of the most desirable 
areas to live in Rio de Janeiro, and there are currently around 40,000 
residents in this small neighborhood.  In addition to some of the most 
expensive apartments in town, Ipanema also contains a favela, which is 
located on top of the mountain Cantagalo and contains 1,500 houses with 
approximately 4,700 residents.  Within this microcosm inside Ipanema, 
formal “asphalt law” competes with the informal law of Pasargada, 
excellently explained in Sousa Santos’s seminal socio-legal article.11 
 
9  At the Conference on Law and (in)formality at Stanford Law School, I received from Ather Zia 
feedback indicating that this practice is accepted by anthropologists, and is labeled auto-anthropology. 
10  ROBERT BATES, ET AL., ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES, (Princeton Univ. Press 1998). 
11  See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 6-124. 
2014] Law & (In)formality at Ipanema Beach 187 
 
Ipanema Beach is an intriguing socio-legal space for a number of 
reasons.  The neighborhood has been depicted in many films and soap 
operas and it has become an iconic beach in the imagination of Brazilians.  
Therefore, the Beach regularly receives many more foreign visitors than its 
own resident population.  Tens of thousands of beachgoers are distributed 
across different parts of the Beach, each of whom belong to one of the 
many social tribes.  Close to lifeguard tower Number Ten, beachgoers can 
predominantly be characterized as “yuppies,” young urban professionals in 
their twenties and thirties.  In this area, there is a concentration of lawyers, 
economists, engineers, and business people, who gather together in front of 
different tents.  Given that this part of the beach is popular among yuppies, 
it is full of people on weekends, but quite empty on weekdays. 
Close to lifeguard tower Number Nine, beachgoers can be 
characterized as “hippies,” alternative, young, free-spirited individuals in 
their twenties and thirties.  In this area, there is a concentration of artists, 
journalists, and jobless people, who also have their own favorite tents.  As 
many of these people have flexible schedules, are jobless, or free-lance 
workers, this part of the Beach is almost always full.  Close to lifeguard 
tower Number Eight, beachgoers can be characterized as LGBT, as this is 
how they tend to self-identify. In this area, tents usually display a rainbow 
flag as an invitation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transvestite customers.  
As Rio has become a very popular destination for the international LGBT 
community, particularly for New Year’s Eve and the notorious carnival, 
this part of the beach is packed every Brazilian summer. 
In addition to these three lifeguard towers,12 beachgoers also divide 
themselves between 150 different tents.  These different tents are licensed 
by the city, and their owners have a formal permit to sell food and drinks, 
and to rent out beach chairs and sun umbrellas.  Local beachgoers usually 
establish one of these tents as their meeting point and frequently go to the 
exact same tent, where they are likely to meet their beach friends.  These 
tents function as reference points for social networks, and groups of 
frequent beachgoers from the same social tribes aggregate here.  
Relationships between beachgoers cannot be compared to a close-knit 
community13 or a close ethnic network,14 but regulars get the chance to 
 
12  During the symposium Manuel Gomez and Grettel Zubiaur asked me about the other lifeguard 
towers at Ipanema Beach. Numbers One to Six are located at Copacabana Beach and Numbers 11 and 
12 are located at Leblon Beach. Lifeguard Tower Number Seven is a meeting point for beachgoers from 
the suburbs, because several bus stops are located very close to this part of Ipanema Beach. In a 
subsequent study, I should investigate the existence of informal social norms there as well. 
13  Allan Shapiro, Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 415, 415-38 
(1976). 
14  See generally Barak D. Richman, How Community Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 J. LAW & SOCIAL ENQUIRY 383, 383-420 (2006). 
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meet each other, talk to people who go to the same tent, and to interact in a 
complex way with other beachgoers.15  Their social interactions are 
analogous to a club,16 where membership is not limited to those who pay an 
annual fee and have membership cards.  In these beach tents, individuals 
enter social networks by repeatedly playing the social game of visiting the 
same spot on the beach, interacting with local people, gaining a reputation, 
and getting accepted as a member of a given social tribe.  In other words, 
there are informal processes of social interaction that result in the inclusion 
or exclusion of an individual within these social networks.  As these beach 
tents are open to everyone, anyone may use them as their reference point, 
but outsiders,17 and one-shot players,18 will not have easy access to the 
social network. 
As Ipanema Beach is free and open to the general public, people from 
all different socio-economic strata go there.  Therefore, individuals from 
lower, middle, and upper classes share the same territorial space, as 
everyone is entitled to choose their spot on the white sands freely.  On one 
hand, all Brazilian individuals have equal access to the beach and use the 
same geographical area.  On the other hand, individuals differentiate 
themselves according to various cultural aspects that define their group 
membership and social networks.  In this sense, there are all sorts of 
distinctions that approximate and distance individuals.19  In addition to the 
membership in different social tribes of yuppies, hippies, and the LGBT 
community, socio-economic background also contributes to inclusion or 
exclusion within these social networks.  In particular, the poor residents of 
favelas may have less opportunity to be accepted as members of an upper-
class group of friends and vice versa.  Interestingly, these complex social 
networks are primarily centered on the three lifeguard towers and 150 beach 
tents, which have a symbolic impact on the different social tribes and 
individual interactions.  As evidenced, Ipanema Beach constitutes a 
complex socio-legal space, in which people distribute themselves not only 
around beach towers and tents, but also via cultural symbols of social 
distinction, economic class, and tribal membership.20  Locals can easily 
 
15 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623-87. 
16 See Richman, supra note 14, at 395-98. 
17 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623-87. 
18 Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 95-160 (1974). 
19 PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Routledge 
2013). 
20 Another fascinating example of a complex socio-legal space is found at Manuel A. Gomez’s 
contribution to this symposium. Manuel A. Gómez, The Tower of David: Social Order in a Vertical 
Community, 10 FIU L. Rev. 215 (2014); see also Manuel A. Gómez, Order in the Desert: Law Abiding 
Behavior at Burning Man, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. (2013); Manuel A. Gómez, Dusty Order: Law 
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identify these aspects, distinguish each other accordingly, and position 
themselves within their social tribes, networks, and classes.  There are a few 
opportunities for social movement, but these are clearly limited.  
Transcending social boundaries is not so common. 
III.  LEGAL RULES ON IPANEMA BEACH: FOOD MARKETS, SPORT, AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF PETS 
Ipanema Beach is a spatial area permeated by formal, legal rules 
enacted at federal, state, and municipal levels.  First, the Brazilian Federal 
Constitution of 1988 defines all maritime beaches as property of the 
Union.21  However, the Federal Constitution is silent on the consequences 
or implications of this clause.  One possible interpretation is that these areas 
may not be transferred to particular individuals, as they are public by 
definition.  However, the Federal Constitution does not expressly prohibit 
private use or private possession of property within these maritime beaches.  
In addition, according to Brazilian administrative law, public property may 
be temporarily disposed of, or leased to private individuals, or to 
corporations.22  Likewise, some public properties require payment for their 
use, to finance the associated costs. On many occasions, the state will 
charge fees, tariffs, and tickets to cover intrinsic expenses for providing or 
conserving a public service.  For instance, access to the Theatre of Rio de 
Janeiro is limited to those who purchase a ticket.  Also, some ecological 
parks charge visitors for environmental conservation of the visited unit, 
and, on some federal roads, drivers must pay a toll to use this public good.  
According to administrative law, all federal property can be temporarily 
transferred or leased to private individuals or corporations;23 nothing in the 
Federal Constitution prevents a ticket, fee, or toll from being charged to 
users of these public goods. 
Interestingly, the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro also contains 
rules regarding maritime beaches, even if these federal properties do not 
belong to the State.24  The State of Rio de Janeiro included in its 
 
Enforcement and Participant Cooperation at Burning Man, in PLAYA DUST: COLLECTED STORIES FROM 
BURNING MAN (Samantha Krukowski, ed., 2014). 
21  See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 [FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION OF BRAZIL] art. 20, IV (Braz.), DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.10.1988. 
Article 20, section IV reads, “the Union has property of . . . the maritime beaches.” 
22  Evandro Martins Guerra, Bens Públicos, 21 REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DO ESTADO 
DE MINAS GERAIS, N. 3 (2003), available at http://200.198.41.151:8081/tribunal_contas/2003/03/-
sumario?next=2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
23  Id. 
24  CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO] art. 32, II; art. 268, II (Braz.). 
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constitution the fundamental right of access to beaches.25  According to 
Article 32 of the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro, “the state shall 
guarantee access to the beaches for all citizens, prohibiting within its 
competence any private building on the sands.”26  In 2000, this fundamental 
right was expanded through State Law Number 3430/00, mandating that all 
municipalities should remove private building on the sands within the 
following thirty days and that parking places should be demarcated to 
guarantee full access to everyone.27  In addition, the State Constitution of 
Rio de Janeiro granted special status to Rio’s beaches, by classifying them 
as areas of permanent environmental protection.28  These areas are entitled 
to special environmental protection, which means that, according to Article 
261, section XV of the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro, the State should 
promote judicial and administrative measures to establish the liability of 
polluters.29 
In addition to these federal and state legal rules, the Rio de Janeiro 
municipality also established a series of laws and decrees, with a view to 
regulate the Beach.30  Analyzing the content of these local rules, there is 
clear and abundant evidence as to how the protection of beaches is 
important for the municipality.  For example, Municipal Law Number 
5459/12 established the legal perpetuation of Copacabana Beach due to its 
environmental, cultural, and visual importance.31  In concrete terms, this 
means that any modification to the beach’s boardwalk, kiosks, benches, 
guardrails, and anything else must be approved by the executive powers 
governing the Beach. 
 
25  CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO] art. 32, II (Braz.). 
26  Id. 
27  Lei No. 3430, de 28 de Junho de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
29.6.2000 (Braz.). 
28  See CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO] art. 268, II (Braz.). 
29  See id. at art. 261, XV (Braz.). 
30  Lei No. 5,459, de 19 de Junho de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
26.12.2012 (Braz.). 
31  See Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 08.09.1995 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO 
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998  (Braz.); Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho 
de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, (Braz.); Decreto No. 27,955, 
de 21 de Maio de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 22.05.2007 (Braz.); 
Decreto No. 35,179, de 2 de Março de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
05.03.2012 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,231, de 5 de Junho de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.6.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,486, de 5 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO 
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.8.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 38,295, de 11 de Fevereiro de 2014, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 13.02.2014 (Braz.). 
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In addition to this law, following UNESCO’s recognition of Rio’s 
landscape as a world cultural heritage site, Rio’s Mayor edited two decrees 
that make this combination of mountains and beaches an area of 
environmental protection and (also) a park.32  At least according to the law-
in-the-books, this should mean that these parts of the city are granted 
special protection and should be restored to their natural states.  In practice, 
some of the areas that make up Rio’s unique landscape are mountains 
containing favelas with tens of thousands of people; politicians will tend not 
to remove these illegal houses for the sake of beautifying the landscape.  On 
the other hand, it would be a mistake to imagine that these decrees only 
have some kind of mythological meaning.  They are intended to convey the 
message that this landscape should be protected and that the mayor will not 
tolerate new invasions, illegal occupation, or the growth of the existing 
favelas.  Time will tell if the current mayor will actually pursue this agenda 
or not. 
Local legislation also regulates the activity of beach vendors, kiosk 
owners, sport players, pet owners, and mass event organizers.33  The former 
mayor edited a comprehensive decree that consolidated the existing 
municipal regulations regarding the Beach and its surroundings.34  
According to Decree Number 20,225/01, beach vendors must be annually 
authorized by the municipality to pursue their economic activities.  Some 
vendors are ambulant and walk across the entire beach, while others have 
the authorization to set up tents in specific spots.  Only a very limited range 
of products can be commercialized by beach vendors: beer cans; soft drinks 
and water; coconut water; caipirinhas; fruit juices; mass-produced 
sandwiches; biscuits; mass-produced potato chips; and mass-produced 
popsicles.35  Ambulant vendors are also authorized to sell caps, sunscreen, 
and general accessories.36  Local legislation strictly prohibits homemade 
food as well as the preparation of food on the beach, particularly with 
respect to grilled barbecue, grilled cheese, and pastries.37  Regarding the use 
of tents, owners must wear a standard uniform, keep only three containers 
for their products (which reduces their capacity to provide cold drinks for 
all beachgoers on summer days), display a menu list with all prices, remove 
the entire structure of their tents from the sands daily, and collect all 
 
32  See Decreto No. 37,231, de 5 de Junho de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.6.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,486, de 5 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO 
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.8.2013 (Braz.). 
33  Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, (Braz.). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at art. 6 (Braz.). 
36  Id. at art. 6, X (Braz.). 
37  Id. at art. 6, § 2 (Braz.). 
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garbage within a distance of twenty-five meters of their stall.38 
In addition to selling products, they are also entitled to rent up to ten 
sun umbrellas and twenty beach chairs to beachgoers.39  They may also 
install a small shower for free use by beachgoers.  In addition to ambulant 
and fixed beach vendors, this decree also regulated the activity of 
boardwalk kiosks, which may sell hotdogs, corn, pizzas, pastries, candies, 
fruit, coffee, milk, and chocolate.40  Their capacity is limited to a maximum 
of six tables with four chairs.  This municipal legislation regulates the food 
market on Rio’s beaches by establishing a legal framework for economic 
activity and the grounds for municipal inspection and control.  Beach 
vendors and kiosk owners may be sanctioned with fines ranging from 
seventy-five to one-hundred-and-fifty U.S. Dollars and, in cases with repeat 
offenders, loss of their permits. 
The same decree also authorizes the establishment of sports academies 
on the beach for practice of volleyball, football, footvolley, and gymnastics, 
in which a specific part of the beach is designated for the practice of these 
sports.41  According to this decree, the practice of frescobol close to the sea 
during summer was prohibited between eight o’clock in the morning and 
four o’clock in the afternoon.42  Frescobol is a sport in which two or three 
players exchange a rubber ball with special wooden rackets and their goal is 
to keep playing without letting the ball fall on the ground.  Players are, 
therefore, not competing against each other, but rather cooperating with 
each other.  Created in Rio de Janeiro in 1945, frescobol became a very 
popular sport.  However, as beachgoers were constantly hit by rubber balls 
on their way to the sea during crowded summer months, the municipality 
restricted its practice to early mornings, late afternoons, or close to the 
boardwalk.  A more recent decree altered these prohibitive rules to the 
restriction of frescobol between eight o’clock in the morning and two in the 
afternoon from November until April.43  Finally, another important legal 
restriction is related to pets.  Since 1995 it has been compulsory for all dogs 
on the boardwalk to be identifiable and chained up.44  No pets are allowed 
 
38  Id. at art. 7 (Braz.). 
39  Id. at  art. 7, § 4 (Braz.). 
40  Id. at art. 18 (Braz.). 
41  Id. at art. 32 (Braz.). 
42  Id. at art. 23 (Braz.). 
43  Decreto No. 27,955, de 21 de Maio de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] 
de 22.05.2007 (Braz.). 
44 Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
08.09.1995 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO 
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998  (Braz.). 
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on sandy parts of the Beach.45 
IV.  (IN)FORMAL LEGAL ENFORCEMENT AND ITS MULTIPLE ACTORS: 
NEUTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, FRAGMENTATION, 
SEGMENTATION, AND COOPERATION 
Formal rules are generally considered to be only one aspect of the 
complex scenario of legal regulation on Ipanema Beach.  Law enforcement 
also depends on informal social norms that are not expressly law in the 
books, but which are developed socially through the operation of law in 
action.46  Some authors suggest that informal social norms constitute their 
own particular normative universe.47  For instance, Sousa Santos conceives 
the law of Pasargada as a relatively autonomous set of social norms that are 
generated in stark contrast to the formal legal rules enacted by the Brazilian 
state.48  Likewise, Sally Moore refers to social norms that regulate the 
garment industry in New York as a semi-autonomous field.49  Other authors 
consider there to be a dynamic interplay between formal legal rules and 
informal social norms.50  Gunther Teubner refers to the Janus face of legal 
pluralism and highlights the complex dualism between legal rules and 
social norms, law and society, formal and informal, rule-oriented and 
spontaneous behavior.51 
Likewise, Benton criticizes the structuralist separateness between 
formal and informal sectors in economic discourse and the dichotomy 
between lawful and unlawful activities in legal discourse.52  Introducing the 
idea of rule shopping, Benton invites us to consider the complexity of legal 
phenomena and how extra-legal maneuvers may sometimes be necessary to 
assure the legality of certain activities.53  Benton also criticizes the multi-
layered vision of formality and informality, as there should be no 
hierarchical relationship between formal legal rules and informal social 
 
45 Id. 
46 See generally STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, & ELISABETH MERTZ, LAW IN 
ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER (New York: Foundation Press 2007). 
47 See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 5-126; see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: 
The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 
(1973). 
48 See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 5-126. 
49 Falk Moore, supra note 47. 
50 Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1443, 1443-62 (1992); Lauren A. Benton, Beyond Legal Pluralism: Towards a New Approach To Law 
in the Informal Sector, 3 SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 223–42 (1994). 
51 See Teubner, supra note 50. 
52 See Benton, supra note 50. 
53  See generally id. 
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norms.54  In addition to this idea of a heterarchical relationship between 
state and society, her work indicates that formality and informality are 
intertwined on the same plane and that non-legal social arrangements are 
essential for the regulation of economic activity.55  Furthermore, she 
explains, informal sectors are also strongly influenced by formal legal 
rules.56 
Particularly in the case of Ipanema Beach, regulation may be 
considered complex due to the multiplicity of legal actors involved in 
inspection, control, and law enforcement.57  As maritime beaches are 
property of the union, federal authorities are entitled to deliberate over their 
use, designate areas, and eventually lease them out.58  Particularly important 
is the role of the Brazilian Navy, which should monitor the national coast 
and manage land use of the coastal area, including maritime beaches and 
islands.  As the coast constitutes a large part of the country’s population 
over an area of approximately 7,408 kilometers, the Brazilian Navy does 
not have sufficient personnel or financial resources to exercise effective 
control over this expansive coastal area.  Therefore, even though the 
Brazilian federal system concentrates responsibilities for coastal 
management on the Federal Government, the Union welcomes cooperative 
support from the state and municipal governments for management and 
protection of these coastal areas.  As a result, states and municipalities 
exercise competences that are not strictly theirs according to the Federal 
Constitution.59  This results in a complex web of federal, state, and 
municipal legal rules and enforcement actions over the Brazilian coast. 
There are a number of different enforcement agents at Ipanema Beach.  
For instance, there are four lifeguard towers, in which state officials from 
the fire brigade control areas of 800 meters, monitoring swimmers, surfers, 
and beachgoers in general.  Their official mandate implies rescuing people 
at sea.  Because they are well-respected by the population and have 
permanent stations, these lifeguards are subject to certain extra-legal 
demands. Likewise, military police officers patrol the white sands and the 
boardwalk of Ipanema Beach; their professional mission is supposedly 
limited to crime prevention and the prosecution of criminals.  However, as 
public officials in the area, the population requests that they solve conflicts 
 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  In addition to Laura Benton, the critique of multi-layered normativity is also found at Eric 
Feldman’s contribution to this symposium regarding the complex regulation of electronic cigarrettes. 
Eric A. Feldman, Layers of Law: The Case of E-Cigarettes, 10 FIU L. REV. 111 (2014). 
58  See Martins Guerra, supra note 22. 
59  CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO] arts. 32 261; 266; 268 (Braz.). 
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that are not related to criminal offenses.  In addition to firemen and 
policemen, municipal guards are also expected to patrol and conduct 
inspections on the vendors at Ipanema Beach, but the municipality employs 
a limited number of these public officials across all of Rio de Janeiro’s 
forty-six beaches.  This scenario of limited enforcement capacity is not far 
from the one revealed by research conducted on lobster poaching inspectors 
in Canada60 and cattle trespassing control in Shasta County, California.61  
Therefore, control of deviants depends primarily on self-help, secondarily 
on reports to authorities and, only as a last resource, to formal law 
enforcement through the application of fines.62 
The prohibition of animals on the Beach and the restriction of 
frescobol by the shore provides prodigious examples of the informal 
practices of law enforcement.  As these legal rules are imposed by 
municipal decree, enforcement agents should, strictly speaking, be 
municipal guards.  However, in the absence of these agents (who are 
incapable of monitoring hundreds of thousands of beachgoers over sixty 
kilometers of beaches in Rio de Janeiro), individuals take the initiative of 
directly complaining to those who take their dogs to the white sands or play 
frescobol by the water.  If complaints are not sufficient in deterring these 
deviants, threatening to report to the authorities may suffice to interrupt the 
illegal conduct.  If individuals insist on playing frescobol, beachgoers may 
request the presence of a public official (not even necessarily a municipal 
guard, but lifeguards or military police officers instead) and the rackets and 
balls will be confiscated or the deviants will be requested to leave Ipanema 
Beach.  Fines are not applied for this illegal conduct. 
Interestingly, the legal rules invite their own neutralization as a 
mechanism of command and control, and they were enacted with an 
innovative framework that actually induces this cooperative model of 
regulation.63  For instance, the municipal decrees that prohibited pets and 
required identification and chains for dogs on the boardwalk expressly 
indicate that individuals are expected to complain and ultimately to report 
the presence of animals on the beach to municipal guards.64  These local 
legal rules also clarify that police officers, firemen or any other public 
official will enforce the law, if municipal guards are not found.  In addition, 
 
60  John McMullan & David Perrier, Lobster Poaching and the Ironies of Law Enforcement, 36 
LAW & SOC’Y REV.  679, 679-718 (2002) [hereinafter McMullan & Perrier]. 
61  Id. at 679-718. 
62  Ellickson, supra note 1, at 625 n.3. 
63  McMullan & Perrier, supra note 60, at 679-718. 
64  Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
08.09.1995; Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997; Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE 
JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998  (Braz.). 
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these municipal decrees specifically mention that educational campaigns 
will be conducted annually to persuade the population of health and safety 
issues that justify the prohibition of animals on the beach.65  Finally, these 
legal rules do not indicate any specific formal sanction for deviation.66  
Therefore, municipal guards are not authorized to fine individuals who 
repeatedly bring their dogs to the white sands.  In exceptional 
circumstances, however, municipal guards may fine dog owners who fail to 
collect animal feces but under another local legal rule that imposes this duty 
on pet owners in general.67 
The regulatory strategy of the municipality employs informal lines of 
action, communication, influence, and control that both enable and routinize 
illegal practices.68  As repeat players, dog owners learn through experience 
that they will not suffer formal sanctions and they test different places, 
times, and authorities to learn how to take their dogs to the white sands of 
the beach without being sanctioned.  In this case, strict compliance is not 
necessary: walking dogs early in the morning or late in the evening averts 
this cooperative model of regulation between beachgoers and the 
authorities.  Likewise, there is a small beach called Praia do Diabo 
(“Devil’s Beach”), which is known for its extremely dangerous currents. 
This small beach is located at the far north end of Ipanema and has oft been 
considered a safe haven for walking dogs because it mainly attracts surfers 
who are not bothered by the presence of animals on the sand.  In this case, 
as informal social norms authorize the presence of dogs in specific times 
and places, formal law is translated informally into the very same practices 
that it seeks to control.69 On one hand, the legal rule contains a broad 
prohibition of animals on beaches.70  On the other hand, dog owners 
empirically test this prohibition, seeking social norms that allow what the 
formal rules seem to prohibit under particular circumstances.  In this sense, 
beachgoers are shopping for norms in places like Devil’s Beach.71 
Legal rules should no longer claim normative centrality or monopoly 
because legal pluralism has eroded positivistic claims to formal legality as 
the single normative authority in society.72  Consequently, informal social 
 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  McMullan & Perrier, supra note 60, at 679-718. 
69  See id. 
70  Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 
08.09.1995 (Braz.). 
71  These examples are analogous to cases of accepted deviance presented by Mark Edwards in 
his contribution to this symposium. Mark Edwards, Layers of Law and Social Ordering: Of Mirrors, 
Bulwarks, and Safety Valves, 10 FIU. L. Rev. 19 (2014). 
72  John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism? 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986). 
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practices are considered essential for effective law enforcement and societal 
regulation.  Decentering regulation removes the state from the apex of 
social control, shifts the relationship between state and society from a 
hierarchical to a heterarchical position, and brings complexity into the 
regulatory space.73  In practical terms, knowledge and power are 
fragmented and reconstructed as a result of the dynamic interaction between 
social and governmental actors.74  Decentering regulation also collapses the 
distinction between private and public, viewing hybrid organizations or 
networks as regulators and taking self-regulation seriously.  It addresses 
internal regulation through design and implementation of regulation inside 
an organization (internalization of rules of conduct by its own members 
without external control). It also focuses on external regulation through 
practices like contracting (in which the organization and external parties 
negotiate contractual terms and become responsible for creating, 
monitoring, and enforcing norms).75  Black finds that the attractiveness of 
self-regulatory regimes lies in the fact that regulators are also regulated by 
culture, are accountable and more democratic, and the distinction between 
principal and agent may collapse.76 
Particularly on Ipanema Beach, informal networks function as co-
regulators of socio-legal space.  Groups of regular beachgoers develop their 
own informal social norms according to their social tribes.  For instance, 
close to lifeguard tower Number Eight, same-sex couples are free to display 
their affection publicly, and kisses between lesbian and gay couples have 
been common in this part of Ipanema Beach for decades.  In this small safe 
haven for the LGBT community, homophobia is strictly prohibited and all 
beach vendors exhibit rainbow flags that symbolize gay pride.  Close to 
lifeguard tower Number Nine, marijuana is freely smoked and any attempt 
to repress consumption in this area is faced with stark resistance by the 
social network of hippies who inhabit this space.  On this part of the Beach, 
flags adorned with marijuana leaves and Bob Marley are common. 
In contrast, close to lifeguard tower Number Ten, social norms are 
embedded in a more elitist normative ethos.  This social tribe established 
itself very close to the upper class “Rio de Janeiro Country Club” and the 
exclusive residential building Cap Ferrat, which is indicative of their more 
mainstream perspectives.  On this part of the beach, drug consumption and 
 
73  Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a Post-Regulatory World (issue 1), 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001). 
74  Id.; MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE 
FRANCE 103-46 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2009) (1977-
78). 
75  Black, supra note 73. 
76  Id. 
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same-sex love are uncommon practices and would be socially taboo.  
Likewise, law enforcement agents would not be criticized for arresting 
someone for smoking marijuana in this area.  In other words, a complex 
array of social norms is generated according to the shared values of these 
social networks and these regulate behavior in different spaces of Ipanema 
Beach. 
In addition to these social tribes, the role of the fixed tent vendors is 
also relevant.  These individuals manage the space around their tents and 
play an important part in the experience of regular beachgoers.  They are 
expected to provide cold drinks, chairs, and umbrellas for everyone.  They 
are also responsible for the cleanliness of their share of the beach.  
Furthermore, they have to respect consumer protection legislation by 
displaying a price list, controlling people’s individual consumption, and 
charging prices correctly.77  As small business units, these tents are not 
subject to any formal regulatory agency and are simply inspected by 
municipal agents who check their compliance with Decree Number 20,225/
01.  They are largely self-regulated or co-regulated by social networks.  For 
instance, especially during summertime, beachgoers press beach vendors 
for chairs and sun umbrellas and they rent many more of these than the ten 
umbrellas and twenty chairs permitted by legislation.  Beach vendors in 
Ipanema rent more than the legal limit, due to such a strong business 
demand, and they make enough money on any summer day to cover a fine 
of seventy-five U.S. Dollars.  What’s more, inspections are also often made 
during peak periods, when chairs and umbrellas are distributed to customers 
on the Beach and municipal guards do not walk around to count how many 
umbrellas and chairs bare each vendor’s logo. 
Regarding cleanliness, beach vendors are always equipped with a few 
large plastic bags to collect garbage, but these are not sufficient for all of 
the garbage in the area.  Therefore, garbage collection on the sands is a task 
performed by multiple actors.  Ipanema Beach has a number of “can 
collectors,” as picking up beer and soft drink cans and selling them as scrap 
for aluminum recycling (fifty cans for one U.S. Dollar) has become an 
informal profession in Brazil. Beachgoers dispose them on nearby sands 
(but never close to their own personal belongings) and a can collector will 
come and pick them up.  Many individuals also take care of their own waste 
and dispose of it in garbage cans when they leave the Beach.  Tent vendors 
also collect a part of this waste, but several garbage collectors work daily to 
clean the white sands of Ipanema Beach for the following day. 
In addition to informal practices of environmental protection, there are 
 
77  Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, art. 7, VI (Braz.). 
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also social norms regarding consumer protection.  Tent vendors are 
expected to control food consumption and to charge these expenses when a 
client leaves the Beach.  However, and particularly during summertime, 
trusted regulars may be responsible for the control of their own expenses, as 
tent vendors may want to focus on controlling the expenses of non-regulars.  
These outsiders should also be aware to ask for prices, especially if they are 
foreign tourists.  Many beach vendors do not display a list of prices in their 
tents (contrary to regulations), and, as they are aware that European and 
American currencies are highly valued, they may charge more to these 
outsiders than they would charge locals.  For these outsiders, asking for the 
price is important, and consumer protection becomes a matter of self-help.  
On a few occasions, private networks may force price reductions.  For 
example, if a tourist takes some food, opens the package, and only then asks 
for the price, an ambulant vendor may say that this product costs two or 
three times the normal price; local beachgoers may protest, tell the tourist 
not to pay, and say that they will call the police.  In this case, the ambulant 
vendor is likely to charge the normal price. 
There are also informal dynamics of antitrust law in play at Ipanema 
Beach.  Beach vendors usually exchange information, and all ambulant and 
fixed vendors raise their prices together through consensus.  There is thus 
little competition, and all products are sold at exactly the same prices across 
the sands.  Beachgoers may resist these anti-competitive measures by 
refusing to buy the vendors’ products and by bringing their own food and 
drinks to the Beach.  As Ipanema Beach is divided between various social 
tribes and multiple networks, typical problems associated with collective 
action (i.e., a lack of coordination and communication among beachgoers) 
usually prevent these informal antitrust measures.  However, at least once, 
the collective reaction of consumers was felt by the vendors who reduced 
their prices to a former figure in response.78  These informal antitrust 
measures also have limited success because bringing food to the Beach is 
not fashionable.  One of the many cultural distinctions informally 
established at Ipanema Beach between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is 
that one group of beachgoers will consume products from the beach 
vendors, whereas another group will bring their own food to the Beach.  
One of the pejorative terms to refer to ‘have-nots’ is farofeiro, which means 
that a person brings a yucca dish to eat at the beach.  Therefore, the ‘haves’ 
are always reluctant to bring their own food to the beach, even when prices 
become unfair.79 
 
78  See Gabriel Saboia, Para Fugir dos Precos Elevandos, Carioca Reedita ‘Farofa’ na Areia, O 
DIA RIO, (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2014-01-20/para-fugir-
dos-precos-elevados-carioca-reedita-farofa-na-areia.html. 
79 As demonstrated by Eden Sarid in his contribution to this symposium, Eden Sarid, Don’t Be a 
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In fact, consumer demand has created incentives for segmentation and 
the establishment of an informal market of ambulant vendors who sell 
unauthorized food on the Beach.  According to the municipal decree, 
ambulant vendors may only sell mass-produced sandwiches, potato chips, 
biscuits, and popsicles.80  However, as there was a strong demand for a 
variety of different products, ambulant vendors started to sell Middle 
Eastern food, Japanese food, salty pastries, seafood, hot dogs, grilled 
cheese, and homemade sandwiches and cakes.  Apparently, the initial 
rationale for food restriction was the prevention of food poisoning and 
intoxication.81  Poor conservation and a lack of hygiene concerns local 
authorities; such lax practices may affect the health of beachgoers (who 
may eat a toxic shrimp or a contaminated homemade egg salad sandwich).  
Nonetheless, consumers seem to ignore these alleged risks and continue to 
purchase these unauthorized products; the increasing demand creates great 
incentives for additional entries into the food market on Ipanema Beach. 
Unlike playing frescobol by the sea and pet owners walking their dogs 
on the sand, the variety of food offered by vendors does not bother 
beachgoers: no one complains about it or threatens to notify the authorities 
of illegal sushi or unauthorized kibbeh on Ipanema Beach.  Additionally, 
Brazilian newspapers widely publicized the prohibition of dogs and the 
restriction of frescobol, but have never reported that only a limited 
assortment of food could be sold at the beaches.  On the contrary, the local 
media has often praised the growing variety of exquisite food available on 
Ipanema Beach.82  These unauthorized food suppliers tend to work as 
ambulant vendors, who may escape inspection as deftly as a Mexican 
bullfighter dodges the horns of his opponent.83  Even if municipal guards 
fine the vendors, their profits from food sales easily offset the customary 
seventy-five dollar penalty.  Moreover, informal social norms at Ipanema 
accommodate those in the food market, and the existence of sophisticated 
 
Drag, Just Be a Queen—How Drag Queens Protect their Intellectual Property without Law, 10 FIU L. 
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80 Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
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81 See Bom Dia Rio, Operação Verão da Vigilância Sanitária Começa Nesta Sexta nas Praias do 
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unauthorized food suppliers contradicts the intuitive impression that 
wealthy consumers will reject these products.  At least in Ipanema, informal 
and formal market players operate together and serve consumers from all 
different social tribes.  However, as local legislation prohibits the sale of 
certain products, tent vendors comply with legal rules and do not risk losing 
their work permits to attend to market demand for a broader choice of food 
items. 
Informal social norms are disseminated through internalization within 
the different tribes and networks.84  Individuals learn and internalize 
particular social norms as a result of shame and peer pressure against 
deviant behavior.85  As a central reference point for social networks of 
regular beachgoers, tent vendors may also mediate social relationships in 
this area.  Though tent vendors should not be perceived as formal lawyers 
with expertise in alternative dispute resolution, they may function as 
informal mediators on occasion, first talking to the individuals in a personal 
conflict, then calling for a peaceful solution to the problem.  This role may 
also be performed by police officers, lifeguards, municipal guards, and even 
other beachgoers.  Discussions between partners, friends, and strangers on 
the Beach will rarely result in a formal judicial complaint.  In fact, disputes, 
conflicts, and controversies are rare and, when they do occur, are almost 
always solved on the Beach.  Only rarely are parties taken to a police 
station, as the majority of interpersonal disputes can be solved informally at 
the Beach.  In the absence of a cheap and easily accessible formal juridical 
organ,86 disputes are informally solved by various fragmented and informal 
entities that exercise the role of juridical organs on Ipanema Beach.87  
Particular disputes may also be solved through persuasion (acceptance due 
to identification with authority figures, enthusiasm generated by a group, or 
relation to values held in high regard).88 
On Ipanema Beach, conflicts are not solved under “the shadow of the 
law,”89 as formal law is almost never enforced to solve disputes between 
 
84 See generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000). 
85 Id. 
86 A prodigious example of a fast and inexpensive formal juridical organ is Tokyo’s Tuna Court 
brilliantly described by Eric Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish 
Market, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 332-44 (2006). 
87 In contrast to a formal juridical organ like Tokyo’s Tuna Court, the literature offers interesting 
examples as well as fragmented and informal entities of dispute resolution, for instance, self-help by 
ranchers in Shasta County.  See Elickson supra note 1, at 676-85.  For more on Resident’s Associations 
at Brazilian favelas, see Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 38-89. 
88 Id. 
89 In this sense, Ipanema Beach resembles Shasta County, where formal law does not strongly 
influence informal dispute resolution mechanisms.  See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623 n.3; see also id. 
at 667-71. 
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beachgoers.  Conflicts are normally solved under the shadow of a sun 
umbrella or a beach tent, since other beachgoers, or a vendor, may function 
as persuader or mediator.  Likewise, even public authorities try to solve 
conflicts through informal conversation before proceeding to the police 
station, producing the official paperwork, and eventually arresting an 
offender.  Only for more serious criminal offences (e.g., robbery, theft, or 
assault) would the police abandon their patrolling duties on the sands, while 
minor offences (e.g., verbal assault, disorderly conduct, or harassment) 
would not be registered. The police take notice of minor offenses, but these 
offenders are not officially charged.  As the police have to optimize limited 
resources and control large crowds, the criminal code during summer days 
is, in practice, reduced to the more serious crimes and petit crimes are not 
regularly repressed.  Ultimately, none of the Beach’s legal actors are keen 
on leaving Ipanema Beach before due time.  This may be the worst sanction 
for everyone: trade a day on the Beach for a day of bureaucratic procedures 
at a police station.  This reflects the general consensus that formal law 
should only be applied as a last resort.  As suggested by Sousa Santos, law 
resembles a chameleon.90  Sometimes, formal legal rules are enforced as 
such, but sometimes their colors change and informal social norms 
metamorphose the law into a new form.91 
Mapping the law in action at Ipanema, we observe the differences of 
scale, projection, and symbolization explained in Sousa Santos´ legal 
cartography.92  Regarding scale, the Union owns all beaches, but may not 
operate at the local level, where we find large-scale law.  The state and the 
municipality operate at the local level, but without investing sufficient 
institutional and symbolic resources.  Therefore, informal social norms 
develop through social tribes.  Further, social networks interact with the 
formal legal rules in play at the Beach, and this socio-legal space is shaped 
by values held by the middle and upper classes.  In terms of symbolization, 
the idea that Brazilian beaches are democratic spaces is mythical, as there is 
not equal participation and symmetrical power for all beachgoers at 
Ipanema Beach.  All beachgoers are distinguished by particular cultural 
traits, socio-economic backgrounds, and membership to tribes and 
networks.93 
In this sense, the stark differentiation between asphalt and the favelas 
 
90 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading Toward a Postmodern Conception of 
Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 299 n.3 (1987) [hereinafter Sousa Santos, Map of Misreading]. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF 
TASTE (Routledge Classics 2013) (1984). 
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that socially divides Rio de Janeiro is also present at the Beach.94  Social 
hierarchies are reproduced, and social interaction between the ‘haves’ and 
“have-nots” is low.  Ipanema Beach is neither horizontal nor heterarchical.95  
Beachgoers share the same geographical area, but their Beach experience is 
socially different.  This relates to an obvious concern regarding the 
protection of private property on the sands.  Because there are not enough 
law enforcement agents, individuals cooperate within their social networks 
to secure their private property.  For instance, whenever a group of friends 
go to the sea, they ask their neighbors to watch their belongings to prevent 
theft.  Tourists are outsiders; therefore they are usually unaware of these 
informal social arrangements and may also be unaware of the socio-
economic division between “haves” and “have-nots” at Ipanema, making 
their property more vulnerable. 
V.  LAND OCCUPATION AND LEGAL CULTURE: INACCESSIBLE BEACHES, 
PRIVATE GAIN, AND CONQUERING SPACE THROUGH RITUAL 
Law usually regulates land occupation, classifies private and public 
property, defines different modes of land acquisition, and disciplines quasi-
property regimes, such as possession and collateral rights that are not 
equivalent to property.  In the case of Ipanema Beach, the Federal 
Constitution simply defines beaches as property of the Union,96 and the 
State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro guarantees the fundamental right of 
access to beaches as well as the removal of private edifications from the 
sands;97 formal legal rules neither discipline land occupation nor establish 
how citizens should enjoy their fundamental right of access to the beaches; 
rather, informal social norms define how land is occupied at Ipanema 
Beach. 
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the Brazilian idea that beaches are 
democratic spaces, there are two small beaches between Ipanema and 
Copacabana that are closed to the public.  Even though the State 
Constitution of Rio de Janeiro guarantees access to beaches,98 these two 
particular beaches are inaccessible.  Since they are located within a military 
fortress, beachgoers are not allowed to enter the area.  These two small 
beaches are right next to the Devil’s Beach, and soldiers remain vigilant in 
order to prevent surfers, and beachgoers in general, from reaching these 
 
94 Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 126. 
95 LAURENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 1-15 (1999). 
96 See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
OF BRAZIL] art. 20, IV (Braz.), DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.10.1988. 
97 CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE 
JANEIRO] art. 32, II (Braz.). 
98 Id. 
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prohibited sands.  Interestingly, these two beaches are occasionally rented 
out by the fortress administration for private events, such as weddings and 
parties.  In fact, in 2013, the Aquello Beach Club, which is presented as a 
case study below in section VII, used them to host an event.  Moreover, 
family members of the military have access to the area and may reserve 
these beaches for barbecues or other social gatherings.  Therefore, there is a 
clear gap between the law in the books and the law in action, as access to 
these in-fortress beaches is very limited. 
On the other hand, public spaces are explored in economic terms with 
a view for financial return to very few.  First, parking close to Ipanema 
Beach is very limited, and some individuals have decided to exploit this 
scarce resource.  These individuals locate themselves close to public 
parking places, orient drivers toward empty ones, and guide the car so it is 
accommodated in a parking bay.  However, they expect to be paid for this 
work and for taking care of the automobile.  In contrast to most European 
and American cities in which drivers find empty places and pay for this 
service through a parking meter, taking care of cars in the street has become 
an informal profession in many parts of Brazil.  In some circumstances, 
drivers are indirectly threatened when they refuse to pay these car watchers 
and warned that Ipanema is a dangerous neighborhood in which the vehicle 
is vulnerable to theft or vandalism without proper vigilance.  Drivers, 
therefore, tend to give in money to these informal car watchers in order to 
avoid being victimized. 
Second, tent vendors also exploit the Beach, as they are licensed to 
rent chairs and sun umbrellas.  In this way, they organize land use around 
their tents by diffusing beachgoers in the areas where they locate their 
chairs and umbrellas.  As they do not have exclusive rights over the area, 
anyone may bring his or her own chairs and umbrellas.  Land use, by 
beachgoers, is defined by prior self-establishment, and newcomers will 
respect those who have already established themselves in a given area.  
Rules of etiquette suggest that some space should be left for the free 
movement of beachgoers, especially in areas with access to the sea and 
tents.  During summer however, different groups of people are usually 
situated very close to each other and walking around the beach becomes 
more difficult. 
Sport schools also have an area reserved for the practice of volleyball, 
soccer, or footvolley.  Likewise, companies may temporarily rent beach 
areas and designate them for specific activities.  For instance, the Bank of 
Brazil regularly sponsors beach volleyball or soccer tournaments, during 
which large areas on the sands are closed off for purposes of creating of a 
provisory arena.  Likewise, there are sometimes concerts or religious 
ceremonies on the Beach, during which certain areas are reserved for music 
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producers or churches.  Furthermore, areas may be temporarily closed for 
private parties (particularly on summer evenings, New Year’s Eve being a 
favorite).  In any event, simply saying that the Beach is a public area 
obscures the fact that it is privately used and exploited by different 
economic agents. 
One interesting fact regarding the occupation of space on Rio de 
Janeiro’s beaches relates to the use of the beach wrap, popularly known as 
canga.  In addition to being used as a cover up for women on their way to 
the Beach, the beach wrap is also used to define land use.  As this artifact is 
essentially feminine, there are subtle games between men and women 
regarding being welcome on someone’s beach wrap.  As this wrap 
demarcates a woman’s intimate territory, access is limited to friends and 
significant others, like boyfriends or girlfriends, life partners or sex buddies, 
and also those finding their way into the particular universe of personal 
affection.  A single man could, in theory, buy his own beach wrap, take it to 
the Beach, and lay down on it, but he would be perceived as an outsider, or 
as eccentric.  Tourists are often seen lying on hotel towels, which clearly 
indicates their outsider status.  Local men often sit on beach chairs and 
negotiate access to the beach wraps of the women whom they are interested 
in becoming more intimate with.  Though these beach wraps are not 
Aladdin’s flying carpet, they involve personal rituals to conquer space, 
recognition of personal affection, and have their own anthropological 
magic.  In other words, they represent more than just a piece of cloth on the 
white sands of Ipanema Beach and have a symbolic value that may not 
easily be observed without an anthropological perspective. 
VI.  LAW AND ORDER AND RESISTANCE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND 
BROKEN WINDOWS 
 Most of the analytical narratives above refer to the socio-legal norms 
on Ipanema Beach that ran until approximately 2008.  In 2009, a newly 
elected mayor promised to establish public order in the entire city.  As part 
of his political agenda, a Secretariat for Public Order was established, 
whose mission involves the effective enforcement of legal rules and the 
elimination of informal social norms.99  For instance, informal car watchers 
were substituted with formal licensed workers, who now charge a fixed 
price and are more respectful to drivers.  Tent vendors are now inspected by 
municipal guards more frequently and are more careful to comply with 
legal rules.  Before these inspections, many tent vendors would not wear 
their official uniform to work.  As this is now a legal requirement, tent 
 
99 Globo Online, Paes Promete Criar a Secretaria de Ordem Pública, OGLOBO, (Sept. 16, 2008), 
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vendors usually wear their uniforms to work.  Likewise, establishing public 
order involved enforcing local laws that prohibit a wide variety of food 
choices for beachgoers.  Since 2009, sushi, seafood, and grilled cheese 
appear less frequently on Ipanema Beach.  Furthermore, the presence of 
animals has been strictly prohibited.  Municipal guards enforce the 
prohibitive law even at the Devil’s Beach, where beachgoers tolerate dogs 
walking on the sand.  Until 2008, there were some twenty municipal guards 
responsible for inspections in Rio de Janeiro.  Since 2009, at least 200 
public officials have been mobilized to support the operations of the 
Secretariat of Public Order on the beaches during summer. 
All these measures that strictly enforce legal rules were received with 
skepticism from the media and were met with resistance from disciplined 
individuals.100  For instance, informal car watchers still try to work on 
streets that are not covered by formal workers.  Tent vendors insist on 
renting more umbrellas and chairs than allowed by their permits.  
Unauthorized ambulant vendors still commercialize prohibited food, even 
though the risks of being caught and eventually sanctioned are higher.  
Newspapers finally publicized the governmental decision that only mass-
produced food should be consumed on the beaches and suggested that even 
coconut water could be banned by the municipal administration.  As a 
consequence of these public critiques, the mayor announced that there were 
no plans to ban coconuts from Rio’s beaches and also established a decree 
in which ambulant vendors of iced tea, lemonade, and starchy biscuits were 
considered to be part of the cultural heritage of Rio de Janeiro.101  
Furthermore, a recent law has determined that the city must annually 
produce educational campaigns regarding prohibited food on the beach, and 
kiosks and tents should also display this information to consumers.  Dog 
owners organized an invasion of Devil’s Beach on September 11, 2011, and 
simultaneously took dozens of pets on the sands to protest against strict 
enforcement of legislation by the secretary of public order.  All these 
episodes are interesting examples of resistance to law enforcement through 
informal social practices. 
The most prodigious example of resistance to the application of legal 
rules on the Beach was observed at the hippie’s social tribe, close to 
lifeguard tower Number Nine.  In 1995, the State Secretary of Public Safety 
began to arrest marijuana smokers on the Beach; he wanted to eliminate the 
free smoking zone designation near lifeguard tower Number Nine. As a 
 
100 In analogous cases, Lawrence Friedman highlights the clash between high law and low law in 
his contribution to this symposium. Lawrence M. Friedman, High and Low Law, 10 FIU L. REV. 53 
(2014). In my account, however, socio-legal normative orders emerge within complex networks. 
101 Decreto No. 35,179, de 2 de Março de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 05.03.2012 (Braz.). 
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consequence of the constant police operations and the imprisonment of 
hippie beachgoers, members of this tribe decided to establish a cooperative 
arrangement to prevent future imprisonment of marijuana smokers.  A 
group of self-proclaimed anarchists distributed 1,500 plastic whistles and 
this social tribe took it upon themselves to make lots of noise to warn 
potential marijuana smokers of the presence of police officers in their area.  
This created sufficient time for smokers to throw away their marijuana 
cigarettes and to hide their marijuana in safe places.  This example 
demonstrates the importance of networks within different social tribes, and 
how this particular tribe enacted an informal social norm of collective 
cooperation as a guarantee for the social norm that originally established the 
area as a free zone for marijuana consumption.  In more recent years, a 
permanent military police tent has been established right next to the 
lifeguard tower Number Nine.  As a consequence, the entire tribe decided to 
move a couple of hundred meters south and the community of hippies is 
now located at Nine and a half, instead of directly at point Number Nine, as 
before. 
 Recent initiatives for stricter law enforcement are related to 
consumer protection.  Inspectors are demanding that all vendors display a 
list with products and their prices.  In addition, public officials from the 
Municipal Department of Consumer Protection will join municipal guards 
in their inspections on the Beach.  The mayor recently established this 
special consumer protection program through a decree.102  In addition, 
despite a few episodes of resistance to formal law enforcement, polls 
indicate that eighty percent of the population approves the movement of law 
and order on the beaches.103  Therefore, the Secretariat for Public Order 
coordinates the annual program “Shock of Order” on the beaches during 
summer.  Since 2009, Ipanema Beach has been a preferential target for this 
program and several inspections have taken place. 
VII.  A DEMOCRATIC BEACH? 
This range of disciplinary measures invites the academic assessment of 
the widespread idea that Brazilian beaches are democratic spaces.  In 
Foucauldian terms, power is exercised by public authorities not only to 
impose discipline, but also to regulate the behavior of the masses.104  As a 
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disciplinary power, inspectors impose a pattern of normality and punish 
abnormal behavior through fines, suspensions, and other modes of 
punishment.  Since 2009, there has been regular surveillance and discipline 
of beach vendors.  In this sense, Ipanema Beach has become a venue where 
Foucauldian power micro-physics operates and a form of political optics is 
clearly in action. 
Interestingly, Ipanema Beach provides a prodigious example of 
fragmented power being widely used by various non-state actors.  Power is 
exercised by beach goers, beach vendors, lifeguards, municipal guards, 
police officers, and car watchers.  In sum, everyone involved in this space 
imparts its power dynamics through way of their decisions and behavior, 
which shape the political landscape of Ipanema Beach.  In this sense, 
deepening Foucauldian power micro-physics, we may conceive multiple 
power vectors in various directions of conduct and counter-conduct.  The 
sum of these political vectors differs according to the area, tribe, and 
network we study.  For instance, around lifeguard tower Number Eight 
multiple small acts of LGBT pride protect the public display of same-sex 
affection there.  Likewise, around lifeguard tower Number Nine multiple 
small acts of cooperation between marijuana smokers protect its free 
consumption and resistance to imprisonment.  On the other hand, 
microphysics of power around lifeguard tower Number Ten are mainstream 
and operate according to the status quo, so the sum of political vectors is 
very different here from competing areas.  As a result, near tower Number 
Ten, moral or legal repression of a same-sex kiss or a drug arrest will not be 
resisted by the fragmented power of individual actors. 
In addition to disciplinary power, there are many bio-power dynamics 
on Ipanema Beach.105  Foucault referred to this type of power as 
“governmentality” and characterized it as demographical control of large 
groups of the population106  Instead of punishing, bio-power focuses on the 
regulatory control of behavior.107  In this sense, the stark distinction 
between the law on asphalt and the law of Pasargada traced by Sousa 
Santos makes a huge difference to the socio-legal experience of “haves” 
and “have-nots.”  Unsurprisingly, anthropologist Julia O’Donnell identifies 
the social invention of the Copacabana Beach as a process of symbolic 
reconstruction of the sands, as a space destined for fashionable local 
elites.108  As a consequence, the urban poor were regulated and controlled 
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not only by public authorities, but also by members of the local elite who 
would reprimand their behavior, through shaming and blaming dynamics, to 
exclude them from their social networks.109 
A careful local observer knows that there is a stark contrast between 
the “haves” and the “have-nots” on the beaches in terms of their social 
contacts, their consumption patterns, and their perception of other groups of 
people. In this case, it seems that all three social tribes previously identified 
are somehow similar in the sense that “have-nots” are excluded from the 
middle and upper class networks.  Likewise, members of the local elite 
imagine that they have an entitlement over their beach experience and that 
both the space and its symbolic significance should be shaped by their own 
fragmented power and informal social norms.  In this sense, the elite’s 
discursive practices usually blame the urban poor for the ruin of their beach 
experience. 
Along with this, there is the mystique of democratic beaches and an 
exotic association of these geographical areas with a form of government.  
However, it seems difficult to accept the idea that there is equal 
participation and symmetrical power for all beachgoers in Brazil.  On the 
contrary, the elites are more powerful in terms of hegemonic cultural 
dominance.110  Therefore, Brazilian media reproduces the upper class 
discourse of deterioration of the Beach experience due to the growing, 
unregulated, undisciplined presence of the urban poor.  These dynamics 
may be characterized as bio-politics,111 because the different networks 
function as a social panopticon that surveys and regulates the urban poor on 
Ipanema Beach.  These regulations are done through symbolic power 
dynamics, who are expected to change their conduct from abnormal to 
normal.  As Foucault associated knowledge and power as fused social 
forces of behavioral control and restated Kelsen’s theory of law as a system 
of normality instead of a system of norms, this notion of bio-politics 
facilitates our comprehension of Ipanema Beach as a socio-legal space in 
which the elite uses its power to regulate the urban poor.112 
However, it should be noted that ‘the masses’ could very well gain 
control over the space.  After the inauguration of a subway stop in Ipanema 
in 2009, the yuppie social tribe did not accept the invasion of lifeguard 
tower Number Ten by masses of urban poor, and the entire social tribe 
migrated to lifeguard tower Number Twelve, in the nearby beach of Leblon 
(two kilometers south of the previous location).  Therefore, Ipanema Beach 
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is falsely characterized as a special democratic place in which all 
individuals have equal participation and symmetrical power.  This socio-
legal space is in fact segmented into different tribes, networks, and classes; 
and its vertical hierarchies lead us to conclude that Ipanema Beach is not 
horizontally formed.113  As O’Donnell puts it, this notion of a democratic 
beach is just a myth.114 
On the other hand, the upper echelons of society enjoy this rhetoric of 
a democratic beach.  An interesting case study comes from the inauguration 
of a beach club inside the Fortress of Copacabana called Aqueloo and 
intended for the upper classes.  As the investors rented the space from the 
military for $150,000, invested $1,500,000 in its internal infrastructure, and 
sold tickets for $125.00 to men and $30.00 to women.115  These high 
investments meant that Aqueloo would have to charge expensive tickets 
and select its clientele based on purchase power in stark contrast with social 
dynamics at Ipanema Beach.  This Beach Club had a dance floor with 
electronic music, a bar, a restaurant, a beauty parlor, a spa, a store, and 
eighteen different VIP areas that could be rented out on a daily basis (the 
cheapest ones for $2,000 and the most expensive one for $10,000).116  In 
terms of commercialized products, clients consumed approximately one 
hundred bottles of the French champagne Veuve Clicquot a day at $180 per 
bottle.117  There were a variety of other luxurious food and drink items on 
the menu, from oysters and seafood to Scotch whisky and Russian vodka.118  
Even though this club was located on a beach, many of the 500 guests 
would spend most of their time on the dance floor and internal areas, as 
opposed to the sands and the sea.  Many of the women would not even be 
dressed in the typical beachwear of a bikini and flip-flops, but rather in 
shorts, shirts, and high heels.  In its two months of operation since 
inauguration on January 7, 2013, the entrepreneurs recovered their 
investment and one hundred employees benefitted from temporary jobs at 
this beach club, which was originally supposed to function until March 2, 
2013.119 
However, the magazine Veja produced a news report entitled “The 
Beach of the Rich” on February 27, 2013 that described Aqueloo as an 
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exclusive place for the wealthiest in Rio.120  Among the interviewees, the 
manager stated that clients could bring their Rolex watches and their Louis 
Vuitton purses without fear of theft, as there were twenty-five security 
guards on duty at all times.121  Sociologist Camila Diniz declared that she 
abandoned Ipanema Beach for the club because of the selected clientele and 
the fact that she could drink champagne and have a hairbrush with 
professionals better than those one would find in France.122  Dominic 
Ahnee, a tourist from Hawaii, praised the beauty of women there, while 
Michelle Shane echoed this idea, saying that there were only beautiful 
people there and that men knew how to approach women.123  Finally, the 
main investor declared that the area was originally used only by the military 
for private functions with their families and that the area was then opened 
up to their clients.124  The entrepreneurs had been so successful that they 
were planning to establish a membership card for frequent guests.  This 
report sparked controversy on the Internet.  An invasion was quickly 
organized via Facebook for the following Sunday, March 2, (scheduled to 
take place just three days after the news report was published) and 1,250 
people confirmed their attendance to this event within twenty-four hours.125  
They were planning to gather together at 10:00 in the morning and invade 
the military area on Aqueloo’s last day.126  As a consequence of this threat, 
the military decided that the club would not function on Sunday, so 
Saturday, March 1, would be Aqueloo’s final day in 2013.127 
Protesters celebrated their victory by claiming that they had restored 
beach democracy in Rio de Janeiro.128  Aqueloo defenders argued that the 
Beach Club was open to everyone who could afford to buy tickets, but now 
no one would be able to reach the fortress’ beach anymore.129  In addition, 
the Beach Club provided jobs and a new tourist attraction for the city.130  
They attributed the controversy to envy and lamented the premature closing 
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of Aqueloo.131  Residents from neighboring buildings celebrated the 
decision, as they had complained against the loud electronic music that ran 
between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.132  They had filed petitions to the 
Attorney General’s Office to investigate the legality of this Beach Club 
inside the fortress of Copacabana.133  This interesting case study highlights 
the false consciousness that beaches are democratic spaces in Brazil.  In 
truth, Brazilians share the same geographical space and there is no apartheid 
on Ipanema Beach, but tribes, networks, and classes establish their own 
mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion, and the logic of informal group 
membership reigns.  Likewise, everyone has free access to the beaches, but 
the space is privately exploited and occupied by all sorts of different socio-
economic actors.  Furthermore, bio-politics and disciplinary power establish 
imaginary hierarchies on Ipanema Beach, which results in a lack of equal 
participation or symmetrical power for beachgoers to shape its socio-legal 
space.  The ‘democratic beach’ is clearly a myth.  In reality, Ipanema Beach 
is segmented by tribes, networks, and classes, which produce informal 
social norms that shape the socio-legal space and reproduce societal 
distinctions on its sands. 
VIII.  FINAL REMARKS 
This article explored the interplay of formal and informal normative 
arrangements and provided an ethnographical analysis of socio-legal norms 
at Ipanema Beach.  For Brazilian society, beaches are so important that 
even constitutional norms regulate their operation and guarantee free access 
for everyone.  This article discussed the existence of an informal food 
market at Ipanema Beach and analyzed its regulation, informal 
arrangements of antitrust (anticompetitive market prices), as well as issues 
of environmental and consumer protection.  In addition, this study assessed 
informal land regimes and discussed which norms are available to regulate 
the occupation of the space by beachgoers, including exploitation for 
private gain.  In this context, tent managers and informal parking space 
finders provide informal arrangements that guarantee parking, tents, and 
chairs for beachgoers.  The state is also present at Ipanema Beach by way of 
municipal guards, police officers, and lifeguards, who are expected to 
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enforce law and order.  This study showed that regulation of space on 
Ipanema Beach is decentered, fragmented, and operates beyond the 
boundaries of traditional public-private divide. 
Furthermore, examples of resistance to legal regulations and to 
criminal law enforcement were analyzed.  For instance, marijuana smokers 
tend to frequent a particular area of the Beach, and make noise to alert 
others of police officers in an effort to prevent arrests.  Further, frescobol 
players are not fined for playing the game at certain times, but at non-
designated times their sanctions consist of warnings, threats of being 
reported to authorities, and eventually the confiscation of the ball.  Dogs are 
generally prohibited, though they are tolerated in an isolated corner of the 
Beach.  In summary, a range of (in)formal normative arrangements 
characterize law and society at Ipanema Beach.  Finally, Brazilians usually 
refer to beaches as “democratic spaces” and this paper investigated the 
exotic association between a geographical area and governmental structure, 
concluding that equal participation and symmetrical power for all 
beachgoers in Brazil is not realistic.  This notion of a democratic beach is 
just a myth, as Ipanema Beach is segmented by tribes, networks, and 
classes, which produce informal social norms that shape the socio-legal 
space and reproduce societal distinctions on its sands. 
In terms of contribution to the socio-legal literature, this article 
demonstrates the relevance of multiple networks for formation and 
implementation of socio-legal normative orders beyond close ethnic groups 
and close-knit communities.134  In this complex scenario, this study shows 
that multiple private and public actors are norm-makers, because their 
individual and collective moves generate reactions of acceptance, 
resistance, and accommodation within this socio-legal space.  For instance, 
acceptance of dogs and frescobol on Devil’s Beach established this area as a 
safe haven for pet owners and racket players. In addition, resistance against 
homophobia, war on drugs, and abusive pricing generated informal 
practices of same-sex protection, marijuana decriminalization and antitrust. 
Moreover, conflicts are accommodated under the shadow of umbrellas and 
the ultimate solution is often different from the law in the books. Adopted 
in the absence or against the state, these normative practices emerge within 
complex networks, because not only the Union, the State, and the City of 
Rio de Janeiro, but also tribes, clubs, and classes establish normative order 
at Ipanema Beach. 
 
 
134 I owe this insight to a conversation I had with Denis Galligan. 
